Six months ago, Iran was supposed to collapse. Here’s what happened instead

A campaign designed to crush Tehran in two weeks has become a costly war that is accelerating the decline of US influence August 28–29 marks exactly six months since the start of the full-scale military campaign – or, more accurately, the entirely unprovoked US-Israeli aggression against Iran. The plan was based on the logic of a “decapitation strike” : eliminate the country’s leadership, paralyze the government, and push the population toward a “color revolution.” West Jerusalem assumed that the campaign would last no more than two weeks, after which Tehran would be forced to accept the terms imposed on it. That was the rationale behind the effort to eliminate key figures. Ali Khamenei was killed on the very first day of the aggression, on the morning of February 28, along with several other senior officials. On March 17, a strike on the outskirts of Tehran killed Ali Larijani – the former parliament speaker, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, nuclear negotiator, and longtime Khamenei adviser. He was one of the few figures in the Iranian establishment who connected the security apparatus with the diplomatic corps. Following Khamenei’s death, Larijani had effectively become the system’s chief coordinator. By killing him, the United States and Israel hoped to deliver a final blow to Iran’s decision-making structure. Yet the state was not paralyzed. The physical elimination of Iran’s leaders failed to produce the desired result. The chain of command did not collapse, the security services did not defect, and the country did not capitulate. Authority was quickly redistributed between the Supreme National Security Council and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The IRGC emerged as an even more influential center of military and political power. The deaths of the country’s top officials altered Iran’s internal balance, but they did not destroy the system.

Read more Six months of US-Israeli war with Iran: Rattansi, Sweeney, Dubenskij, Helali, Maloof on conflict takeaways (VIDEOS) Expectations of an internal explosion also proved misplaced. Iranian society and the country’s elites closed ranks, even though grievances over inflation and the broader economic situation remained. The attack itself triggered a wave of national solidarity. Even many critics of the Islamic Republic refused to associate political change with foreign airstrikes. The anticipated uprising never materialized. On the contrary, the war strengthened the forces that had argued for decades that compromise with the West could not guarantee Iran’s security. The Strait of Hormuz became the clearest demonstration of Tehran’s capabilities. Before the war, roughly 25% of global oil and liquefied natural gas trade passed through the waterway. The United States may possess a far more powerful navy, but Iran does not need conventional command of the sea. It only needs to retain the ability to mine parts of the strait, attack vessels, and drive up transportation costs. Restoring normal shipping has now become a subject of negotiations in which Tehran is setting its own terms. Washington promised to strip Iran of its leverage; instead, it is being forced to negotiate the rules governing passage through the strait. Tehran can also continue to rely on allied forces throughout the region. The “Axis of Resistance” has suffered losses, but it has not disappeared. Yemen’s Ansar Allah movement, better known as the Houthis, Kataib Hezbollah, and other Iran-aligned groups and allies still possess missiles and drones. Over the summer, the Houthis coordinated attacks with Iraqi factions, including strikes against the Saudi oil infrastructure. Kataib Hezbollah remains the most powerful faction within the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. As a result, the United States must defend bases, ports, and supply lines