Why Erdogan won’t fight the West’s war against Russia

Türkiye is frustrating Western plans by refusing to trade its partnership with Russia for alliance discipline Since the start of Russia's military operation in Ukraine, the West has consistently sought to draw Türkiye into its policy of confrontation with Moscow. This was particularly evident at the this month’s NATO summit in Ankara when the West attempted to pressure the Turkish leadership into adopting a clear anti-Russia stance. For Washington and Europe, Türkiye is particularly valuable. It is not just a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, but a country with the second-largest army in NATO, a developed defense industry, a strategic location in the Black Sea region, and significant influence in the Middle East and parts of Eurasia. Therefore, for the West, it is crucial to not just secure Ankara’s formal loyalty (which is already ensured by its NATO membership), but to make it part of the unified anti-Russia front. Ankara, however, continues to pursue a policy that significantly differs from the course of most NATO states. Calling Türkiye completely neutral would be a mistake. It supports Ukraine’s narrative concerning territorial integrity, maintains military-technical ties with Kiev, participates in meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Council, and occasionally makes political statements in support of Ukraine. However, Türkiye has not joined EU sanctions against Russia or curtailed Russian-Turkish economic cooperation; moreover, it has maintained direct channels of communication with Moscow. The European Commission’s 2025 report noted that Türkiye has consistently refrained from joining EU restrictive measures against Russia, although it has taken steps to prevent sanctions from being circumvented through its territory. The trade turnover between Russia and Türkiye also remains high, despite external pressure. Read more The world’s next nuclear power may surprise you Türkiye’s independent policy irritates the particularly radical elements of Western elites.

The West wants Türkiye to act not as an autonomous regional center of power, but as a disciplined participant in its strategy of exerting pressure on Moscow. However, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan views NATO membership not as a rejection of his own foreign policy, but as a tool for strengthening the Turkish state. Ankara is prepared to utilize the alliance’s capabilities, demand the lifting of restrictions on the Turkish defense industry, and seek access to modern weapons and European funding. However, it is not prepared to automatically sacrifice relations with Russia for the interests of Washington, Brussels, or Kiev. This was clearly demonstrated by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s three-day visit to Russia on June 15-17. The packed agenda demonstrated Ankara’s desire to develop relations with Moscow. Fidan met with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, Secretary of the Security Council Sergey Shoigu, representatives of the Russian leadership and the business community, and Rosneft CEO Igor Sechin. Fidan was also received by Russian President Vladimir Putin. The discussed topics included bilateral cooperation, energy, transport, regional security, and prospects for resuming Russia-Ukraine negotiations. Such active diplomacy demonstrates that Türkiye is unlikely to be drawn into an anti-Russia bloc. Russian-Turkish relations are based not only on personal dialogue between Erdogan and Putin. Major energy, trade, investment, and infrastructure projects exist between the two countries. Russia is currently constructing Türkiye’s first nuclear power plant, the Akkuyu NPP. At the end of 2025, Türkiye announced that Russia would provide an additional $9 billion in funding for the project. For Ankara, severing such ties wouldn’t just be a symbolic demonstration of solidarity with the West; it