The EU’s sanctions fever: From Russia to China, a crisis expands

What was once an instrument of discipline is worsening into something much more damaging for the European economy The European Union has taken yet another step in its long-running confrontation with Russia. But what now stands out is not only the scale – it is the restless, almost reflexive expansion of sanctions as a default instrument of policy. In April, EU authorities unveiled their 20th round of sanctions targeting Russia and Belarus, while pointedly extending their reach toward China. Sanctions spiral What was once framed as a targeted response now resembles a sanctions regime without clear geographic or strategic limits. By including 56 designations tied to Russia’s military-industrial complex – 17 of them in China, the United Arab Emirates, Belarus, and Central Asia – the EU has effectively dissolved the boundaries of its own confrontation. Another 60 entities now face tightened export controls tied to alleged contributions to Russia’s defense sector. For the first time, even a Chinese state-owned entity has been targeted by anti-Belarusian sanctions. In Brussels, this is justified through the language of “dual-use” goods. But outside Europe, the perception is of a growing tendency toward economic coercion that stretches legal authority across borders, fueled by an escalating appetite for pressure. China’s response was swift: officials condemned what they described as “long-arm jurisdiction,” rejecting the EU’s attempt to discipline Chinese firms operating far beyond European territory. More importantly, Beijing read the move as a signal of the EU’s shifting posture toward China itself. Within a day, China placed seven European entities on its control list over arms sales to Taiwan, imposing restrictions that mirror the EU’s own extraterritorial reach. These measures prohibit the transfer of Chinese goods to the targeted firms, extending the ripple effects well beyond those directly sanctioned.

The list includes one German entity, two Belgian firms, and four Czech companies – including military industrial manufacturers Omnipol and Excalibur Army, all deeply embedded in supply chains connected to Ukraine. Read more Beijing blacklists EU firms over Taiwan weapons links Beijing pushes back The prominence of Czech firms reflects a deliberate strategic shift in Prague between 2022 and 2025 – a pivot away from Beijing and toward Taipei that has reshaped the country’s geopolitical role. This transformation has been multifaceted. Political engagement with Taiwan has intensified, exceeding the limits of the One China principle. Economically, the Czech Republic has inserted itself into semiconductor supply chains linked to Taiwan, seeking to hedge against dependence on Chinese production. But the most sensitive dimension lies in defense cooperation. Cybersecurity coordination, intelligence exchanges, and the transfer of military equipment have all deepened. Czech-made systems have moved to the island, while Taiwanese components have flowed to Ukraine, often rerouted through intermediaries to avoid scrutiny. This emerging alignment increasingly feeds into the conflict in Ukraine while simultaneously intersecting with tensions around Taiwan. The Taiwan-EU-Ukraine Axis Taiwan has expanded its drone manufacturing footprint in the Czech Republic, anchoring joint initiatives aimed at building shared military-industrial capacity. In 2025, more than 70,000 drones were exported to the Czech Republic and over 30,000 to Poland. Taiwanese high-tech components, European integration and manufacturing, and Ukrainian battlefield deployment form a continuous loop. Systems are developed in one region, assembled in another, and tested in active conflict. What is presented as cooperation or resilience begins to resemble a distributed war economy, stretching across continents while maintaining the app