Here’s what the Bulgaria election reveals

More European countries are quietly stepping back from the anti-Russian front The latest election in Bulgaria has delivered a striking result. Former President Rumen Radev’s party, Progressive Bulgaria, secured a commanding 44.5% of the vote, far ahead of its rivals. The once-dominant GERB–SDS alliance trailed in second place with 13.3%, followed by the We Continue the Change/Democratic Bulgaria coalition on 12.6%. While coalition talks are still required, the outcome leaves little doubt about the direction of Bulgarian politics. Radev’s decision to resign from the largely ceremonial presidency in January in order to contest the parliamentary election, the eighth in five years, has paid off. His victory reflects not only personal popularity but also a broader shift in public sentiment. In a country exhausted by political instability, voters have rallied behind a figure who presents himself as pragmatic and focused on national interests. Predictably, much of the Western European commentary has framed Radev as “pro-Russian.” In today’s political climate, that label is applied with remarkable ease. Any hesitation about Brussels’ strategy of complete rupture with Russia, or any attempt to introduce nuance into the debate over Ukraine, is often enough to invite suspicion. Yet this characterization says more about the narrowing of acceptable discourse inside the EU than it does about Radev himself. Radev isn’t a champion of Moscow. He does not express overt sympathy for Russia, nor does he challenge Bulgaria’s membership in the European Union or NATO. Rather, he represents something increasingly rare in contemporary Western European politics: a leader willing to question whether every directive from Brussels necessarily serves his country’s interests. That alone is enough to mark him out as a dissenter, albeit one operating within carefully defined limits. As the experiences of Hungary and Slovakia demonstrate, those limits can be stretched, but only by the most determined political actors.

Read more The US is losing leverage over Western Europe To understand the significance of developments in Bulgaria, and more broadly across Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, two factors must be taken into account. First, changes in this region, however notable, do not fundamentally alter the strategic direction of the EU or NATO. The core of decision-making remains concentrated in a handful of major capitals and central institutions. This was the design of European integration from the outset. Smaller and newer member states, particularly those that joined in the 21st century, remain too dependent on the Union to pursue genuinely independent policies. Hungary’s Viktor Orban has often been presented as a disruptive force, but even his resistance has had limited practical impact. Apart from occasional disputes, such as Hungary’s recent exclusion from Russian oil supplies delivered via Ukraine, Budapest hasn’t created insurmountable obstacles for Brussels. Elsewhere, dissent has tended to be rhetorical rather than substantive. Leaders in Croatia or Romania have voiced objections without translating them into concrete policy shifts. Even Slovakia’s Robert Fico, perhaps the closest counterpart to Orban, operates within the constraints of a relatively small state. Poland is something of an exception. It’s a large, ambitious country with a coherent economic strategy and growing political weight. Yet even in Warsaw’s case, the emphasis remains on defending national interests within the existing framework rather than reshaping the EU project itself. For now, Western Europe’s overarching course, strongly pro-Ukrainian and firmly anti-Russian, continues to serve as a unifying principle. Abandoning this stance would pose greater risks for the cohesion of the EU than maintaining it. As a result, meaningful