Is Israel trying to start a proxy war in Syria?

Airstrikes near Turkish-linked sites could make the country an arena for two rival regional visions Israeli airstrikes on Syria’s Abu al-Duhur airbase on August 18 unexpectedly turned what might otherwise have looked like another familiar episode of Israeli military activity inside a neighboring country into something far more dangerous. This time, the real recipient of Israel’s warning was neither Iran nor Hezbollah, but Türkiye, which has emerged as one of the principal political and military partners of Syria’s new leadership since the fall of Bashar Assad. Eight strikes hit the airbase, located roughly 70 kilometers from the Turkish border, damaging runways and military infrastructure. Israel said the operation was intended to prevent Syria from allowing Turkish forces to establish a presence there, while US and Israeli officials indicated that one of the objectives was also to disrupt the delivery of advanced Turkish weapons systems to the facility. Shortly before the attack, Mossad chief Roman Gofman had reportedly discussed with Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad Shaibani the expansion of Türkiye’s military footprint, arms sales to Damascus and the possible transfer of drones to the Syrian armed forces. Turkish-Syrian military cooperation itself is hardly a secret. As early as August 2025, Ankara formally agreed to assist the reconstruction of Syria’s armed forces through weapons, military equipment, logistics, training and advisory support, and over the past year, the two governments have steadily deepened that relationship. What remains unconfirmed, however, is whether a new shipment of Turkish weaponry was physically delivered to Syria on August 20. Yet the issue goes beyond that particular shipment. Israel increasingly views the transformation of Turkish assistance from a reconstruction program into a permanent military infrastructure as a strategic shift in the regional balance. It is especially concerned about drones, electronic warfare systems, radar networks and, above all, the eventual deployment of modern air-defense systems that could restrict Israel’s long-standing freedom of action in Syrian airspace.

The escalation between Türkiye and Israel is advancing at a remarkable speed. For the moment, the confrontation remains largely rhetorical, diplomatic and indirect, but Syria has created the very real possibility of a proxy conflict between two states that both possess modern armed forces, sophisticated defense industries and competing visions of the regional order. Syria could become the arena in which those visions collide via the arming of allies, the destruction of military infrastructure and attempts to enforce rival red lines. Such a scenario could become the point of no return. Read more Israel warns Türkiye over Syria Syria is no longer just a buffer zone The most important change is that post-Assad Syria is no longer merely a battleground for Israel’s campaign against Iranian influence. For years, Israel operated within a relatively predictable framework. Airstrikes targeted assets linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, weapons depots and supply routes serving Hezbollah, Syrian air-defense systems and other infrastructure capable of restricting Israeli operational freedom. Türkiye was not directly a part of that equation. Now, Ankara has acquired the opportunity to rely not only on its long-standing military presence in northern Syria and on armed groups historically aligned with it, but increasingly on the central government in Damascus itself. Syria’s new authorities need investment, reconstruction, military training, infrastructure and international political backing, all of which Türkiye is well placed to provide. For Ankara, this represents an unusually favorable strategic opening, allowing it to convert years of costly involvement in the Syrian conflict into lasting influence